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PROMOTING FAIRNESS: A PROPOSAL FOR A
MORE REASONABLE STANDARD OF
CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE IN TITLE VII
DENIAL OF PROMOTION CASES
I. Introduction
Consider the case of an associate in a law firm who strives to be-
come a partner someday. The associate toils for seven or eight years,
just like all the other associates in the office, and does exceptional
work. However, this associate happens to be a woman, and she is
denied the promotion to the partnership even though she was more
qualified than some of the men who were promoted to partner. Angry
and disappointed that she has been denied an opportunity to fulfill her
dream, she resigns and brings a lawsuit against her former employer.
If she can prove her case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,1 the law firm will be liable for a discriminatory denial of promo-
tion,2 and she may be eligible for backpay, reinstatement, and dam-
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 200Oe-2000e-17 (1981 & Supp. 1992). Section 703(a)(1) of Title
VII of the 1964 Act provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
2. The framework for proving a Title VII disparate treatment claim has been estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The method of
proof has three stages. First, the plaintiff must set forth by a preponderance of the evi-
dence a prima facie case of employment discrimination. See McDonnell-Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802. To make out a prima facie case of discrimination in promotion, the plaintiff
must show that he or she applied for a position, was qualified for that position, was
rejected, and that, after the rejection, the employer continued to seek applicants or filled
the position with a person in a non-protected class. See Jolly v. Northern Telecom, Inc.,
766 F. Supp. 480, 493 (E.D. Va. 1991) (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491
U.S. 164 (1989)).
If the plaintiff succeeds in proving a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer
to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. See McDonnell-
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. This burden is one of production only, and the burden of proof
remains at all times with the plaintiff. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
Thereafter, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the em-
ployer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons were a pretext for discrimination. See Bur-
dine, 450 U.S. at 253. To establish pretext, the plaintiff may demonstrate that, despite the
reasons articulated by the defendant, a discriminatory motive led to the challenged deci-
sion, or that the employer's explanation is not worthy of credence. Halbrook v. Reich-
hold Chems., Inc., 766 F. Supp. 1290, 1295 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at
256).
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ages.3 However, unless she can prove that she was "constructively
discharged," she probably will not be eligible for backpay past the
date of her resignation, nor can the court order her reinstatement.
The constructive discharge rule states that if intolerable working
conditions associated with the employer's discrimination force the
employee to resign, then the employee will be considered to have been
"constructively" discharged on the date of resignation.' The em-
ployee will be treated as if he or she had been fired by the employer
and therefore is eligible for remedies traditionally associated with
wrongful termination,6 such as reinstatement and backpay past the
3. Section 706(g) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g), provides, in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is inten-
tionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice,... the court may enjoin
the respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not
limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay....
or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
Id.
Section 706(g) as originally enacted only provided for equitable, as opposed to legal,
remedies. Hence compensatory and punitive damages were not available remedies. See,
e.g., Pearson v. Western Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1976). The only mone-
tary relief available under section 706(g) was backpay, which is considered an equitable
remedy. See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974).
However, Congress amended the employement discrimination statutes in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, Title I, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified at vari-
ous sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.). In order to more effectively "deter unlawful
harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace," Civil Rights Act of 1991
§ 2, the 1991 Act provides for compensatory and punitive damages for women and reli-
gious minorities in cases of intentional discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 198la(a)(1). Com-
pensatory and punitive damages were already available to racial minorities under 42
U.S.C. § 1981. The 1991 Act does place certain monetary limits on the amount of com-
pensatory and punitive damages women and religious minorities can receive. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(3).
4. "Backpay" is a calculation of an amount equal to what the plaintiff would have
earned but for the discrimination, less any amount actually earned, up until the date of
the judgment. See, e.g., Gunby v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir.
1988). The calculation might include both "preresignation backpay," which is the
amount of backpay up until the date of the employee's resignation; and "postresignation
backpay," which is the amount of backpay from the date of resignation to the date of
judgment. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. For purposes of this Note, it is
important to distinguish between the two, since an employee who has not been construc-
tively discharged will not be eligible for postresignation backpay. See infra notes 66-73
and accompanying text.
"Front pay" may also be awarded in a successful Title VII action. Front pay repre-
sents an estimation of future lost earnings, calculated from the date of judgment to the
date plaintiff would regain the position lost because of the discrimination. See Gunby,
840 F.2d at 1123; Goss v. Exxon Office Sys., Co., 747 F.2d 885, 889-90 (3d Cir. 1984); 2
CHARLES A. SULLIVAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 14.4.3 (1988).
5. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
6. See Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1990); Levendos v. Stern En-
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date of "discharge." If the employee has not been constructively dis-
charged, then under the general rule the employee will only be enti-
tled to preresignation backpay.7 In examples similar to this one, the
courts have taken the position that a discriminatory failure to pro-
mote, without more, does not amount to a constructive discharge.'
Since the employee's "working conditions" are not rendered intolera-
ble by a denial of promotion, the courts say, the employee has not
been constructively discharged and therefore will not be entitled to
postresignation relief.9
However, a few recent denial of promotion cases have begun to ease
the restrictions on postresignation relief engendered by the construc-
tive discharge rule.10 These cases have taken two different approaches
to essentially the same reasonableness standard. One case, Ezold v.
Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen," disregarded the constructive
discharge rule and held instead that, even where an employee's work-
ing conditions have not become so intolerable as to amount to con-
structive discharge, the court may still award postresignation relief if
the employee's resignation was reasonable under the circumstances.' 2
Another case, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,'3 held that where an em-
ployee's reasonable expectations of promotion have been completely
frustrated, the employee's "working conditions" have become so in-
tolerable that she has been constructively discharged and is therefore
entitled to postresignation relief. 4 This Note examines the unfairness
that often results from applying the constructive discharge rule rigidly
in Title VII denial of promotion cases, and examines these and other
recent cases for a possible solution.
Part II briefly describes the policies behind Title VII and its relief
provisions. Part II also explains the constructive discharge rule and
illustrates its restriction on postresignation relief. Part III argues that
tertainment, Inc., 860 F.2d 1227, 1230 (3d Cir. 1988); Ralph H. Baxter, Jr., and John M.
Farrell, Constructive Discharge-When Quitting Means Getting Fired, 7 EMPLOYEE REL.
L.J. 346, 347 (198 1)[hereinafter Baxter and Farrell, Constructive Discharge].
7. See infra notes 66-73 and accompanying text. There are, however, cases that rep-
resent a minority rule, which allow an award of postresignation relief even where there
was no constructive discharge. See infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 82-99 and accompanying text.
9. For purposes of this Note, "postresignation relief" includes postresignation
backpay, reinstatement, and front pay.
10. See infra notes 106-149 and accompanying text.
11. 758 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
12. Id. at 310-13. See infra notes 109-137 and accompanying text.
13. 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 490 U.S.
228 (1989), on remand, 737 F. Supp. 1202 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
14. Id. at 472-73. See infra notes 138-145 and accompanying text.
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applying the constructive discharge rule in denial of promotion cases
can undermine Title VII's purposes, and analyzes recent cases that
have addressed the problem. Finally, Part IV proposes that the
courts should adopt the standard of constructive discharge applied in
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, which takes into account an employee's
reasonable expectations of promotion. This standard more readily
furthers the objectives of Title VII and of the constructive discharge
rule, especially where the denial of promotion effectively ends the em-
ployee's career with the employer. Part IV also applies the standard
in three common denial of promotion situations.
II. The Objectives of Title VII and the Constructive
Discharge Rule
A. Title VII and its Relief Provisions
Section 703(a) 5 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title
VII") makes it unlawful for employers to discriminate against any
individual on account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' 6
Employers are prohibited from discriminating against employees with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, in addition to decisions to hire or to discharge.' 7 It is also un-
lawful for employers to limit, segregate, or classify employees or
applicants in such a way as to limit employment opportunities or
otherwise affect their status as employees.' 8
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,19 the Supreme Court set forth the
purposes of Title VII. The broad public policy objective is prophylac-
tic: "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor" one set of employees
over another.2" The second, more immediate, purpose is "to make
persons whole for injuries on account of unlawful employment
discrimination." 2'
To further these policy objectives, Congress vested the district
courts, in section 706(g),22 with broad equitable discretion to provide
remedies for victims of discrimination. Courts have the power to en-
join the employer from engaging in unlawful discriminatory practices
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
17. Id.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
19. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
20. Id. at 417.
21. Id. at 418.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
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and to "order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which
may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employ-
ees, with or without back pay. . ., or any other equitable relief as the
court deems appropriate. 23
"Backpay" is a calculation of an amount equal to what the plaintiff
would have earned but for the discrimination, less any amount actu-
ally earned, up until the date of the judgment. 24  The calculation
might include both "preresignation backpay," which is the amount of
backpay beginning with the discriminatory acts and ending at the
date of the employee's resignation; and "postresignation backpay,"
which is the amount of backpay from the date of resignation to the
date of judgment.25
There are other Title VII remedies that the courts can award pur-
suant to section 706(g). For instance, courts have ordered that suc-
cessful plaintiffs be reinstated into the position they would have
occupied absent the discrimination.26 In addition, courts have
awarded "front pay" 27 where reinstatement is impracticable because it
would be unfair to "bump" an innocent incumbent,2 or because ani-
mosity exists between the parties as a result of the litigation.29 Front
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Gunby v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1988).
25. As a simple, hypothetical example, assume Emily Employee is earning $25,000 as
a personnel representative for XYZ Corp. On July 1, 1991, Employee is discriminatorily
denied a raise, which would have brought her salary to $30,000. She resigns on June 31,
1992 (one year later) and sues XYZ under Title VII. On January 1, 1993, the court holds
that Employee was denied equal pay for equal work in violation of Title VII. The court
would calculate backpay as follows:
Preresignation backpay (July 1, 1991 through June 31, 1992): $30,000 (amount
she would have earned but for discrimination prior to resignation) [minus]
$25,000 (amount she actually earned) [equals] $5,000.
If the court also finds that she was constructively discharged, Employee will also be enti-
tled to postresignation backpay. See infra notes 48-73 and accompanying text.
Postresignation backpay (June 31, 1992 through January 1, 1993): The amount
she would have earned but for discrimination, from date of resignation to date
of court judgment (a total of six months) is $15,000.
Hence the maximum backpay award would be $20,000.
26. Typically, employees who have been unlawfully denied a position, promotion, or
transfer are reinstated or instated into the position by a court exercising its equitable
discretion. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 920 F.2d 967, 976-79 (D.C. Cir.
1990); Spulak v. K-Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1157 (10th Cir. 1990)(Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act case); Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.
1980); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, No. 90-0002, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10270, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 580 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 1991).
27. See supra note 4.
28. See Nobler v. Beth Israel Medical Ctr., 715 F. Supp. 570, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(ADEA case). However, Title VII clearly authorizes the bumping of innocent incum-
bents. Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d 153, 158 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
29. See Spulak v. K-Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150, 1158 (10th Cir. 1990)("the antago-
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pay represents an estimation of future lost earnings, calculated from
the date of judgment to the date plaintiff would regain a position com-
parable to the one lost on account of the discrimination.3"
Although the courts have wide discretion 31 in fashioning appropri-
ate Title VII remedies, that discretion must be exercised with defer-
ence to Title VII's statutory objectives:32 eradicating workplace
discrimination and making persons whole for injuries suffered
through past discrimination.33 For instance, in Albemarle the Court
held that an award of backpay should be denied only if that denial
nism between Spulak and K-Mart has only increased as a result of the litigation, which
the district court described as 'bitterly contested from start to finish' "); Goss v. Exxon
Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 890 (3d Cir. 1984)(stating that no judicial order could
make existing ill feelings engendered by the litigation disappear); Cassino v. Reichhold
Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1987); Whittlesey v. Union Carbide, 742 F.2d 724,
728 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Daines v. City of Mankato, 754 F. Supp. 681, 703 (D. Minn.
1990)(in awarding front pay, court referred to both innocent incumbent and potential
animosity between parties).
30. See Gunby v. Pennsylvania Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 1108, 1123 n.15 (3d Cir. 1988);
Goss v. Exxon Office Sys., Co., 747 F.2d 885, 889-90 (3d Cir. 1984); SULLIVAN, supra
note 4, § 14.4.3.
31. The broad scope of relief under section 706(g) was reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976). In Franks, the Court
indicated that the scope of Title VII relief was not limited to the specific remedies -
reinstatement and backpay - listed in section 706(g). Rather, Congress had vested federal
courts with "broad equitable discretion" and the power "to fashion such relief as the
particular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution, making whole insofar
as possible the victims of racial discrimination." Id. at 763, 764. The Court said that,
like the backpay remedy, plaintiffs who are discriminated against in hiring are presump-
tively entitled to retroactive seniority. Id. at 771-73; see also ARTHUR LARSON AND LEX
K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 55.20, at 11-19 (rev. ed. 1990)
("Although Section 706(g) specifically mentions only reinstatement and hiring as two
possible remedies under Title VII, the courts, in an attempt to return the victim of em-
ployment discrimination to his proper status, have also ordered promotions, transfers,
mergers of segregated seniority systems, alteration or abolition of discriminatory seniority
or referral systems, and other miscellaneous forms of affirmative relief").
32. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 226 (1982).
33. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975). In Albemarle, the
Court held, inter alia, that a class of black employees at a paper mill who had been locked
into low paying jobs by a discriminatory seniority system were presumptively entitled to
backpay. Id. The Court rejected Albemarle's argument that its lack of bad faith should
preclude an award of backpay:
If backpay were awardable only upon a showing of bad faith, the remedy would
become a punishment for moral turpitude, rather than a compensation for
workers' injuries. This would read the "make whole" purpose right out of Title
VII, for a worker's injury is no less real simply because his employer did not
inflict it in "bad faith." Title VII is not concerned with the employer's "good
intent or absence of discriminatory intent," for "Congress directed the thrust of
the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the
motivation."
Id. at 422 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)(emphasis in
original)(footnote omitted)).
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"would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of [Title VII]."34
Subsequently, the courts interpreted Albemarle to mean that suc-
cessful Title VII plaintiffs are presumptively entitled to backpay,35
since backpay furthers both objectives of Title VII. First, backpay
liability deters workplace discrimination by serving as a "spur or cata-
lyst" to cause employers to self-evaluate and to correct unlawful prac-
tices.3 6  Second, the backpay remedy furthers Title VII's "make-
whole" objective37 by restoring successful plaintiffs "to a position
where they would have been were it not for the unlawful
discrimination. 3 8
The former employee's entitlement to backpay, however, is subject
to the duty under section 706(g) to mitigate damages by seeking
"other suitable employment."39 Section 706(g) provides, in pertinent
part, that "[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable
diligence by the person or persons discriminated against shall operate
to reduce the backpay otherwise allowable."' For instance, in Hel-
bing v. Unclaimed Salvage and Freight Co., Inc.,4" the female plaintiff
was discriminatorily denied a promotion to store manager on Novem-
ber 1, 1976,42 and she resigned February 9, 1977.43 The court found
the defendant store liable for failure to promote and awarded the
plaintiff backpay in excess of $23,000." However, this amount re-
flected the court's reduction of "amounts earnable with reasonable
34. 422 U.S. at 421.
35. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 719 (1978)
(referring to the "Albemarle presumption" in favor of backpay).
36. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 417-18 (reasoning that if employers faced only the
prospect of an injunctive order, rather than presumptive backpay liability, they would
have little incentive to "shun practices of dubious legality").
37. Id. at 418-19.
38. 118 CONG. REC. 7166, 7168 (1972)(Section 706(g) was "intended to give the
courts wide discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete
relief possible" so that those discriminated against are "restored to a position where they
would have been were it not for the unlawful discrimination")(section-by-section analysis
of H.R. 1746 introduced by Senator Williams, accompanying the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 - Conference Report).
Title VII's backpay provision, section 706(g), was expressly modeled on the backpay
provision of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1988), which has a
make-whole purpose. See Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 419 n.l1.
39. Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231-32 (1982).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The burden of proving the plaintiff's lack of reasonable
diligence rests upon the employer. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324
(1977).
41. 489 F. Supp. 956 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
42. Id. at 959.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 964.
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diligence."45 After her resignation, the plaintiff had only searched for
retail management positions, even though her previous management
experience was slight.46 The court did not consider this to be a rea-
sonably diligent search, so it reduced her backpay award by $9,240,
the amount plaintiff could have earned working full-time at minimum
wage during the backpay period.47
B. The Constructive Discharge Rule as a Limitation
on Title VII Relief
1. The Constructive Discharge Rule
The constructive discharge issue arises frequently in the relief phase
of Title VII employment discrimination litigation. Typically, a for-
mer employee alleges an underlying discriminatory act - such as un-
lawful demotion, harassment, or failure to promote - and also claims
that her subsequent resignation was involuntary because it resulted
from intolerable working conditions associated with the discrimina-
tion.48 To be eligible for any relief at all, the plaintiff must of course
prove the underlying Title VII violation. To be eligible for pos-
45. Helbing v. Unclaimed Salvage and Freight Co., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 956, 964 (E.D.
Pa. 1980).
46. Id. at 964.
47. Id. The original award was in excess of $40,000, but the court reduced that sum
by amounts actually earned by the plaintiff after the denial of promotion but while she
still worked for the defendant, by amounts earned by plaintiff after she resigned, and by
amounts received by plaintiff in unemployment compensation. Finally, the court de-
ducted the amounts earnable with reasonable diligence, for a total of $23,251. Id. at 963-
64.
In another case, Daines v. City of Mankato, 754 F. Supp. 681 (D. Minn. 1990), the
female plaintiff was denied a promotion in May 1984 to city Housing Director, id. at 684,
so she took a one year educational leave of absence to pursue a graduate degree and then
resigned. Id. at 694. The court held the city liable for discriminatory failure to promote
and retaliation, id. at 695, and ruled that she was entitled to backpay for the period from
May 1984 through December 31, 1989. Id. at 694. However, pursuant to the mitigation
provision of section 706(g), the court concluded that she was not entitled to backpay for
the one year period during which she was a full-time student (July 1984 to July 1985), id.
at 695, 701, since she had "removed herself from the full-time employment market." Id.
at 701.
48. An allegation of constructive discharge can actually arise in two different con-
texts. First, it can arise in the liability phase of an employment discrimination suit. The
employee alleges that the constructive discharge itself was the discriminatory act. If he
or she is unable to prove this claim, then his or her employer is not liable.
The issue more commonly arises in the relief phase of the lawsuit. The employee al-
leges separate discriminatory acts and also alleges that his or her subsequent resignation
amounted to a constructive discharge. If the court finds the employer liable for the un-
derlying discrimination, the extent of relief will depend on whether the employee was
constructively discharged. If the employee was not constructively discharged, the em-
ployer's liability for backpay terminates on the date of the employee's resignation. If the
employee was forced to resign, then postresignation relief will be available, just as if the
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tresignation relief, however, the plaintiff usually must prove construc-
tive discharge.4 9
The general rule of constructive discharge states that "if the em-
ployer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so intol-
erable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation,"
then the employee has been constructively discharged. 0 The test is
an objective one: if the employer's discriminatory acts result in work-
employee was unlawfully dismissed. See Martin W. O'Toole, Note, Choosing A Standard
For Constructive Discharge In Title VII Litigation, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 587 n.4 (1986).
49. See, e.g., Calhoun v. Acme Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561 (1st Cir.
1986)(ADEA case); Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1985);
Levendos v. Stem Entertainment, Inc., 860 F.2d 1227, 1230-32 (3d Cir. 1988); Shealy v.
Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1013 (4th Cir. 1991)(ADEA case); Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d
386, 389-91 (5th Cir. 1990); Easter v. Jeep Corp., 750 F.2d 520, 522 (6th Cir. 1984);
Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989); Smith v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 895 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1990); Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360,
361-62 (9th Cir. 1987); Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 342-43 (10th Cir. 1986);
Wardwell v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, Fla., 786 F.2d 1554, 1557-58 (1 1th Cir.
1986); Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
See generally Baxter and Farrell, Constructive Discharge, supra note 6; Ira M. Saxe,
Note, Constructive Discharge Under the ADEA: An Argument For the Intent Standard, 55
FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1987); Sheila Finnegan, Comment, Constructive Discharge
Under Title VII and the ADEA, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 561 (1986); O'Toole, Note, supra
note 48.
50. Young v. Southwestern Savings & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
This test has several discrete components: (1) the employer deliberately (2) made working
conditions intolerable (3) forcing the employee into an involuntary resignation. Subse-
quent to Young, the circuits split in their interpretation of this language. In determining
whether the employee has been constructively discharged, at least two circuits apply a
subjective "employer intent" test, while the rest employ an objective "reasonable em-
ployee" test.
To prove constructive discharge under the "employer intent" approach, a Title VII
plaintiff must prove that the employer deliberately made working conditions intolerable,
and that the employer's actions were taken with the intention of forcing the employee to
quit. See Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985); Johnson v.
Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981). This employer intent approach
was imported from National Labor Relations Act cases, where the rule was created to
prevent employers from imposing harsh working conditions on union employees in order
to force those employees to quit. See, e.g., Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 222 N.L.R.B.
1068 (1976); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1972).
The "reasonable employee" test merely requires the employee to prove that the work-
ing conditions were intolerable; the employee need not prove that the employer specifi-
cally intended to force the employee to quit. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying
text.
The intent of this Note is not to resolve the split in the circuits. Several other commen-
tators have discussed this issue. See O'Toole, Note, supra note 48 (advocating use of
objective "reasonable employee" standard); Finnegan, Comment, supra note 49 (same);
Saxe, Note, supra note 49 (advocating use of subjective "employer intent" standard, par-
ticularly in ADEA cases). Since only two circuits (4th and 8th) follow the employer
intent standard, this Note presupposes that the correct standard is the majority "reason-
able employee" test.
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ing conditions "so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in
the employee's shoes would have felt compelled to resign,"'" then
there has been a constructive discharge. The plaintiff need not prove
that the employer subjectively intended to force the employee to re-
sign.52 Rather, the analysis under this objective test focuses on the
conditions imposed and whether they were intolerable to a reasonable
person in the employee's shoes.53
Courts are reluctant, however, to predicate a finding of constructive
discharge solely on a single incident of employment discrimination.
Rather, the plaintiff must prove "aggravating factors," such as a con-
tinuous pattern of discriminatory treatment, 54 that raise working con-
ditions to the requisite intolerable level so as to constitute constructive
discharge.
There are several reasons for the "aggravating factors" require-
ment. First, rather than allow an employee to quit at the first sign of
discrimination,55 the courts want the employee to attempt to combat
51. See Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977)).
All of the circuits, except the 4th and 8th, follow this standard. See Calhoun v. Acme
Cleveland Corp., 798 F.2d 559, 561 (1st Cir. 1986); Levendos v. Stern Entertainment,
Inc., 860 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1988); Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1990);
Easter v. Jeep Corp., 750 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1984); Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d
412 (7th Cir. 1989); Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 915 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1990); Spulak
v. K-Mart Corp., 894 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1990); Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc.,
867 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1989); Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 472-73
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
The law in the Second Circuit is unclear. It appears as if the plaintiff must prove that
the employer deliberately made working conditions intolerable. What is unclear is
whether the employer must have imposed the intolerable conditions with the specific
intention of forcing the employee to quit. See Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322,
325 (2d Cir. 1983); Martin v. Citibank, N.A., 762 F.2d 212, 221 (2d Cir. 1985). At least
one recent district court case, however, applied the employer intent test. Azzolini v.
Alitalia Airlines, No. 90 Civ. 3392, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16422, 57 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 758 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1991).
52. See, e.g., Watson v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 823 F.2d 360, 361 (9th Cir. 1987).
53. See Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980).
54. See, e.g., Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (continuous pat-
tern of discrimination, repeated failed attempts to obtain relief from employer from dis-
crimination, and humiliation and loss of prestige accompanying failure to promote
constituted aggravating factors); Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir.
1984)(repeated failure to promote, poor working conditions, embarrassment and humilia-
tion, and racial insults constituted aggravating factors); see also Bourque v. Powell Elec.
Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980)(unequal pay, standing alone, cannot amount to
constructive discharge); Pittman v. Hattiesburg Mun. Separate School Dist., 644 F.2d
1071, 1077 (5th Cir. 198 l)(same). At least one circuit has held that aggravating circum-
stances are not absolutely required to support a finding of constructive discharge. See
Schafer v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 250 (3d Cir. 1990).
55. See Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 1986).
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the discrimination while still employed: "society and the policies un-
derlying Title VII will best be served if, wherever possible, unlawful
discrimination is attacked within the context of existing employment
relationships."56 Second, courts want to discourage the employee
from setting up himself or herself as the judge of every grievance"
and from walking out of situations that may not be discriminatory. 8
Finally, courts associate the constructive discharge rule with the em-
ployee's statutory duty to mitigate damages, stating that the duty to
mitigate encompasses remaining on the job rather than resigning. 9
Examples of the aggravating factors requirement are abundant. In
Bourque v. Powell Electrical Mfg. Co. ," the court held that unequal
pay alone did "not constitute such an aggravated situation that a rea-
sonable employee would be forced to resign. "61 However, in Satter-
white v. Smith,62 the plaintiff, a temporary sweeper for the Port of
Tacoma, was consistently denied promotion, because of his race, to
the position of permanent sweeper. 63 The court found that he had
been constructively discharged, because several aggravating factors
existed. First, the employer's repeated failure to promote the plaintiff
to permanent status prevented him from gaining access to training
56. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980). In other
words, the employee is not entitled to relief beyond the date of his or her resignation in
the absence of a constructive discharge, because it is unreasonable for him or her to resign
where the conditions had not risen to an "intolerable" level. See Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
796 F.2d 340, 343 (10th Cir. 1986).
57. Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, Inc., 860 F.2d 1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1988) (quot-
ing Alicea Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977)).
58. Levendos, 860 F.2d at 1232.
59. Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 389 (5th Cir. 1990)("Where an employer dis-
criminatorily denies promotion to an employee, that employee's duty to mitigate damages
encompasses remaining on the job"); see also Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d
61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980)("We think that unequal pay alone does not constitute such an
aggravated situation that a reasonable employee would be forced to resign. Unequal pay
is not sufficient justification to relieve Ms. Bourque of her duty to mitigate damages by
remaining on the job") but see infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text (describing mi-
nority rule that permits court to award postresignation relief even where no constructive
discharge took place).
60. 617 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1980).
61. Id. at 66. Other employment practices beside unequal pay have been found, in
and of themselves, not to amount to constructive discharge. See Jurgens v. EEOC, 903
F.2d 386, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1990)(denial of promotion); Weihaupt v. American Medical
Ass'n, 874 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1989)(unlawful demotion); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co.,
646 F.2d 1250 (8th Cir. 1981)(casual and intermittent racial slurs); Alicea Rosado v.
Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114 (1st Cir. 1977)(unlawful transfer); see also EEOC v. Miller
Brewing Co., 650 F. Supp. 739, 748 (E.D. Wis. 1986)("Failure to promote is insufficient
by itself to establish constructive discharge. Therefore, the other complaints must be very
offensive").
62. 744 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir. 1984).
63. Id. at 1381.
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and advancement opportunities that the defendant had promised.
Second, the defendant regularly promoted white men ahead of him,
some of whom he even had to train, which caused him to be humili-
ated. Third, his supervisor relegated him to working much of his
hours in the rope room, where he was assigned the dull task of tying
ropes. Finally, an atmosphere existed at the Port in which occasional
racial insults were expressed toward all blacks. 64
In sum, if the underlying discrimination is combined with aggravat-
ing factors that make working conditions objectively intolerable, the
employee's resignation will be deemed involuntary, and the court will
find a constructive discharge.65 If working conditions were not objec-
tively intolerable, the employee's resignation will be deemed volun-
tary, and the court will find no constructive discharge. The effects of
this rule are analyzed in the next section.
64. Id. at 1383. There are many other cases where the court has found aggravating
factors that turned the underlying discrimination into a constructive discharge. See, e.g.,
Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984)(as a result of sex discrimina-
tion, plaintiff was verbally abused and threatened and forcibly transferred to a position
with substantially lower salary and inferior working conditions); Meyer v. Brown & Root
Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1981)(involuntary transfer of pregnant employee to
heavy manual labor that posed substantial risks to her and her fetus' health); Easter v.
Jeep Corp., 750 F.2d 520 (6th Cir. 1984)(discriminatory failure to promote, combined
with employer's toleration of continuous course of sexual harassment by male employees
directed at plaintiff); Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 915 F.2d 424 (9th Cir. 1990)(two
removals of plaintiff's merit pay, once while he was on medical leave, and repeated failed
attempts to invoke grievance procedure); Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir.
1981)(continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment encompassing deprivation of op-
portunities for promotion, lateral transfer, and increased educational training, existing
over a period of several years).
65. The use of the term "aggravating factors" implies that a minimum threshold of
discrimination will be required before a court can, as a matter of law, find constructive
discharge. Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, Inc., 860 F.2d 1227, 1232 (3d Cir. 1988).
The aggravating factors requirement therefore reflects a judicial determination that a sin-
gle incident of discrimination cannot rise to such an intolerable level as to force the em-
ployee to quit. Id. Hence, only when the underlying discrimination is combined with
aggravating factors will the court find that working conditions are intolerable. There
have been no bright-line statements by the courts that indicate what constitutes an "intol-
erable" level. But courts have implied that the aggravating factors requirement applies to
both quantity and quality of the alleged discriminatory acts. Id.
Hence, constructive discharge is a factual issue to be decided by the trier of fact under
the circumstances of each individual case. See, e.g., Sanchez v. City of Santa Ana, 915
F.2d 424, 431 (9th Cir. 1990); Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1382 (9th Cir. 1984);
Steele v. Offshore Shipbuilding, Inc., 867 F.2d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir. 1989); see also
Levendos, 860 F.2d at 1230 ("Courts generally agree that 'constructive discharge' is a
heavily fact-driven determination").
1992] CONSTRUCTIVE DISCHARGE
2. The Constructive Discharge Rule's Limitations on Title VII
Postresignation Relief
The constructive discharge rule is significant because it usually lim-
its the relief available to an employee who has suffered employment
discrimination and has subsequently resigned. If the court concludes
that the employee was not constructively discharged, then even if the
underlying practices are found to be discriminatory, the plaintiff can
usually only recover preresignation backpay.66 If, however, the court
concludes that the plaintiff was compelled to resign because the un-
derlying discrimination created intolerable working conditions, the
plaintiff is entitled to both preresignation backpay and postresignation
relief.67
A finding of constructive discharge can increase significantly the
extent of the plaintiff's award. For instance, in Goss v. Exxon Office
Systems Co.,68 the court awarded the plaintiff $78,454 in backpay,
most of which was calculated for the period after her resignation. She
was also awarded $12,323 in front pay.69 Had there been no construc-
tive discharge, the plaintiff would have recovered neither postresigna-
tion backpay nor front pay, and her award would have been reduced
to only a small amount in preresignation backpay.70 Similarly, in
66. See Morrison v. Genuine Parts Co., 828 F.2d 708 n.l (11th Cir. 1987); Maney v.
Brinkley Mun. Waterworks and Sewer Dep't, 802 F.2d 1073, 1075 (8th Cir. 1986); Derr
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 342, 343 (10th Cir. 1986); Irving v. Dubuque Packing
Co., 689 F.2d 170, 175 (10th Cir. 1982); O'Toole, Note, supra note 48, at 587 n.4.
It is unclear what effect the Civil Rights Act of 1991 will have on the constructive
discharge rule's prohibition of postresignation relief. The 1991 Act permits Title VII
plaintiffs to sue for compensatory and punitive damages in disparate treatment cases, 42
U.S.C. § 1981a, in addition to those remedies already available under section 706(g) of
the 1964 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). However, it does seem logical to infer that, where
the plaintiff has been, constructively discharged, any damage award will be more than
would be the case where the plaintiff was not constructively discharged. Therefore, con-
structive discharge will likely remain a hotly disputed issue in employment discrimina-
tion litigation.
67. See, e.g., Goss v. Exxon Office Sys. Co., 747 F.2d 885, 889-90 (3d Cir. 1984);
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1216 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 920 F.2d 967
(D.C. Cir. 1990); see Baxter and Farrell, Constructive Discharge, supra note 6, at 365-66.
For a description of pre- and postresignation backpay, and of front pay, see supra notes
24-30 and accompanying text.
68. 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984).
69. Id. at 889-90.
70. Ms. Goss had been unlawfully transferred to a less lucrative sales territory on
January 5, 1981. In calculating her backpay award, the District Court had included
preresignation backpay - lost commissions between January 5 and February 23, when
she resigned. Goss, 747 F.2d' at 889. But a bulk of the total backpay award was for the
postresignation period. Though the court did not parse the relative backpay amounts in
the opinion, the preresignation backpay probably amounted to only a few thousand dol-
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Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,"' the court ordered that the plaintiff be
reinstated into the position discriminatorily denied.72 Absent a find-
ing of constructive discharge, an employee who resigns is not entitled
to reinstatement.73
C. The Minority Rule: An Exception to the Prohibition of
Postresignation Relief
Although the general rule of constructive discharge prohibits an
award of postresignation relief if the employee was not constructively
discharged, 74 a few courts have declined to follow the constructive
discharge rule. 7 In awarding postresignation relief even where there
was no finding of constructive discharge, these courts generally have
lars. Hence, most of the backpay and all of the front pay awarded were attributable to
the court finding that she had been constructively discharged.
71. 737 F. Supp. 1202 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
72. Hopkins, 737 F. Supp. at 1216.
73. See Maney v. Brinkley Mun. Waterworks and Sewer Dep't, 802 F.2d 1073, 1075
(8th Cir. 1986); Derr v. Gulf Oil Corp., 796 F.2d 340, 342-43 (10th Cir. 1986); Irving v.
Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 175 (10th Cir. 1982); Morrison v. Genuine Parts
Co., 828 F.2d 708 n.1 (11th Cir. 1987).
74. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
75. Two of the courts are courts of appeals. See Wells v. North Carolina Bd. of
Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1044
(1984)(after denial of promotion from stock clerk to sales clerk, plaintiff quit because of
back injury; since resignation was "causally linked to the defendant's wrongful denial of a
promotion," backpay award would not be cut off); Di Salvo v. Chamber of Commerce,
568 F.2d 593, 598 (8th Cir. 1978)(though employee voluntarily resigned, employer who
discriminated in salary payments was liable for backpay until plaintiff could find job that
paid more than what employer should have paid, because plaintiff's resignation was
"based on mitigative motives").
Most of the courts that have disregarded the constructive discharge rule, however, are
district courts. See Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 303, 310-
13 (E.D. Pa. 1991)(female attorney who voluntarily resigned after being denied promo-
tion to partnership was entitled to postresignation backpay and reinstatement; resignation
was reasonable, since she was denied "the one significant promotion available" to an
attorney); Daines v. City of Mankato, 754 F. Supp. 681, 702 (D. Minn. 1990)(plaintiff
entitled to postresignation backpay even though resignation was voluntary, since resigna-
tion was based on "mitigative motives"); Nobler v. Beth Israel Medical Ctr., 715 F. Supp.
570, 572-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)(plaintiff entitled to postresignation backpay and front pay,
even though there was no constructive discharge, since position from which he was de-
nied promotion was "unique"); Harrison v. Dole, 643 F. Supp. 794, 796-97 (D.D.C.
1986)(rejecting defendant employer's argument that plaintiff's voluntary resignation cut
off her entitlement to backpay and reinstatement; by quitting, plaintiff could mitigate
damages by working at another government agency where she could advance without
discrimination); Helbing v. Unclaimed Salvage and Freight Co., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 956,
963 (E.D. Pa. 1980)(plaintiff entitled to postresignation backpay, since she quit as result
of disagreements with man who was hired for position she was discriminatorily denied);
cf Richardson v. Restaurant Mktg. Assocs., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 690, 696-97 (N.D. Cal.
1981)(plaintiff was fired the same day she turned in resignation effective two days later;
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followed two rationales. First, some courts reason that applying the
constructive discharge rule undermines the purposes of Title VII as
enunciated in Albemarle, since the plaintiff does not receive make-
whole compensation for his or her injury, and the defendant is not
deterred from future discrimination.76
Second, some courts reason that, on the issue of whether the plain-
tiff is entitled to postresignation relief, the relevant inquiry is not
whether the plaintiff was constructively discharged, but rather
whether the plaintiff mitigated damages. For example, in Harrison v.
Dole, 7 7 the plaintiff was discriminatorily denied a promotion to a G-7
position in the United States Maritime Administration (MarAd).78
Subsequently she resigned and joined another federal agency in a posi-
tion similar to the one MarAd had denied her.79 The court awarded
the plaintiff backpay past the date of her resignation, even though
there was no finding of constructive discharge, reasoning that termi-
nating the backpay award upon resignation would "penalize" the
plaintiff for getting on with her career.8 0 The court concluded that
she had mitigated damages by accepting a position with another em-
ployer where she was permitted to advance without discrimination .8
In sum, under the Harrison rule, employees who resign as a result of
backpay period not cut off after two days, since there was intimate causal relationship
between discrimination and plaintiff's decision to resign).
See also Carrero v. New York City Hous. Auth., 890 F.2d 569, 580 (2d Cir.
1989)(plaintiff, after denial of promotion and ultimatum to either accept demotion or
quit, reasonably mitigated damages by choosing unpaid leave of absence); Thorne v. City
of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1134-37 (9th Cir. 1986)(where police departmint typist
was discriminatorily denied opportunity to be hired as police officer, her entitlement to
backpay and front pay was not cut off by her voluntary resignation).
76. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 303, 310-12 (E.D. Pa.
1991); accord Harrison v. Dole, 643 F. Supp. 794, 796-97 (D.D.C. 1986); see also Daines
v. City of Mankato, 754 F. Supp. 681, 700 (D. Minn. 1990)(referring to court's duty to
award make-whole relief); Helbing v. Unclaimed Salvage and Freight Co., Inc., 489 F.
Supp. 956, 963 (E.D. Pa. 1980)(same).
77. 643 F. Supp. 794 (D.D.C. 1986).
78. Id. at 795.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 795-97.
81. Harrison v. Dole, 643 F. Supp. 794, 797 (D.D.C. 1986); accord Daines v. City of
Mankato, 754 F. Supp. 681, 702 (D. Minn. 1990)(plaintiff discriminatorily denied a pro-
motion to Housing Director for City; court awarded postresignation relief, even though
she voluntarily took one year educational leave and then resigned, holding that these
decisions were both part of good faith effort to achieve position equivalent to Housing
Director, and therefore, were based on "mitigative motives"); Wells v. North Carolina
Bd. of Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1983)(where discriminatory denial
of promotion was causally related to plaintiff's resignation, resignation had no relevance
to postresignation backpay but rather bore "only upon the amount of the award"); Ezold
v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 303, 310 (E.D. Pa. 1991)(restric-
tion on postresignation relief "would discourage a plaintiff from mitigating damages by
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discrimination are entitled to postresignation backpay, subject only to
their duty to mitigate.
III. The Constructive Discharge Rule in Denial
of Promotion Cases
A. The Illogic of Adhering Rigidly to the Constructive Discharge
Rule in Promotion Cases
The constructive discharge rule has been consistently applied to bar
postresignation relief to employees who have resigned following a dis-
criminatory denial of promotion. This section argues that application
of the rule in denial of promotion cases can be illogical and can frus-
trate the purposes of Title VII.
Since the guiding principle behind the constructive discharge rule is
that discrimination should be attacked from within the existing em-
ployment relationship, 2 courts generally hold that the "mere fact of
discrimination, without more, is insufficient to make out a claim of
constructive discharge." 3 Thus, to prove constructive discharge, the
plaintiff must show "aggravating factors" that make working condi-
tions "intolerable" to a reasonable employee.8 4 Because of these strict
principles, an overwhelming majority of the courts have found that a
single denial of promotion, without more, does not constitute a con-
structive discharge," since a denial of promotion usually does not cre-
accepting a position at another employer where he or she would be permitted to advance
without discrimination").
82. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
83. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 473 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
84. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
85. See Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 852 F.2d 688, 689 (2d Cir. 1988);
EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 672 (4th Cir. 1983); Jurgens
v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1990); Boze v. Branstetter, 912 F.2d 801, 805 (5th
Cir. 1990); Irving v. Dubuque Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982); Wardwell
v. School Bd. of Palm Beach County, Fla., 786 F.2d 1554, 1557 (11 th Cir. 1986); Jolly v.
Northern Telecom, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. 1991); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr
and Solis-Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1192 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Nobler v. Beth Israel Medical
Ctr., 702 F. Supp. 1023, 1030-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Less v. Nestle Co., 705 F. Supp. 110,
114 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); EEOC v. Miller Brewing Co., 650 F. Supp. 739, 748 (E.D. Wis.
1986); see generally 3 ARTHUR LARSON AND LEx K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMI-
NATION § 86.50 at 17-62 (1989)("Claims of constructive discharge have generally not
succeeded in cases where they are based on ... denial of promotion").
See also Satterwhite v. Smith, 744 F.2d 1380, 1381-83 (9th Cir. 1984)(denial of promo-
tion plus "aggravating factors" constituted constructive discharge); Clark v. Marsh, 665
F.2d 1168, 1174-76 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (same); Thomas v. Cooper Industries, Inc., 627 F.
Supp. 655 (W.D.N.C. 1985) (same); but see Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458,
473 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (denial of promotion to partnership plus employer's refusal to re-
nominate plaintiff as partnership candidate constituted constructive discharge), rev'd on
other grounds and remanded, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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ate "intolerable working conditions. 8 6
To illustrate, in Wardwell v. School Board of Palm Beach County,87
the defendant school board denied the female plaintiff a promotion
from Assistant Director of Transportation to Acting Director of
Transportation, allegedly in violation of Title VII.8 s The Eleventh
Circuit held that a discriminatory failure to promote, while relevant
to the constructive discharge issue, "is not always sufficient to support
a finding of constructive discharge."89 The court concluded that
while the plaintiff was frustrated by her failure to be appointed Acting
Director, and was embarrassed by the denial of promotion, these
facts, together with her added workload, simply did not "rise to the
intolerable level at which a reasonable person would feel compelled to
resign."90
Similarly, in Jurgens v. EEOC,9' the Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission discriminatorily denied a white employee a promo-
tion from Assistant Regional Attorney to Regional Attorney. The
plaintiff subsequently took an early retirement. 92 The court held that
86. See, e.g., Jolly v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 480, 497 (E.D. Va.
1991)(three denials of promotion "angered and frustrated" plaintiff but did not render
working conditions "objectively intolerable"); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-
Cohen, 751 F. Supp. 1175, 1190 (E.D. Pa. 1990)(plaintiff's working conditions at law
firm were not intolerable despite unlawful failure to promote her to partnership); Nobler
v. Beth Israel Medical Ctr., 702 F. Supp. 1023, 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)(plaintiff's working
conditions at hospital not intolerable despite failure to promote him to Director of Radia-
tion Therapy); see also Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 393 (5th Cir. 1990)("dimmed
future job prospects based upon the employer's past discrimination in promotions are not
alone enough to support a finding of constructive discharge"); Willmott v. National Rail-
road Passenger Corp., No. 81-0811 JGP, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1208 at *16 (D.D.C.
January 31, 1991)(despite fact that discriminatory practices frustrated reasonable expec-
tations of promotion, plaintiff was not constructively discharged, since he "offer[ed] no
information regarding his working conditions" and since there was no proof that his
position had become intolerable); cf Contardo v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 753 F. Supp. 406, 411 (D. Mass. 1990) (denial of money-making opportunities to
female stockbroker not a constructive discharge).
87. 786 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1986).
88. Id. at 1555.
89. Id. at 1557 (citing Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65-66 (5th Cir.
1980)).
90. Wardwell, 786 F.2d at 1558.
91. 903 F.2d 386 (5th Cir. 1990).
92. Id. at 387-88. As an ARA, the plaintiff was a grade GS-15 employee and set the
legal policies and trial strategies for the cases handled by approximately seven to twelve
attorneys. As part of a racially-neutral reorganization, the EEOC abolished the position
of ARA but retained that of RA, though reduced in grade from a GS-16 to a GS-15, and
assigned managerial responsibilities similar to those of the former ARA. Id. at 388. Af-
ter the denial of promotion to RA, and as part of the reorganization, the EEOC offered
the plaintiff the choice of accepting (1) a demotion to Supervising Trial Attorney, a non-
management GS-14 position with supervision over three to five attorneys, or (2) an early
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while the plaintiff had been unlawfully denied the promotion,93 he had
not been constructively discharged, because his expectation of future
discrimination in promotion was "highly speculative" and therefore
was not an aggravating factor.94
Adhering rigidly to the constructive discharge rule in denial of pro-
motion cases can often lead to harsh results, especially where the de-
nial of promotion completely frustrates the employee's reasonable
expectations for advancement." For example, in Jolly v. Northern
Telecom, Inc.,96 the African-American plaintiff was discriminatorily
denied three promotions into management at a large telecommunica-
tions company, and was told that he would not be promoted to man-
agement in the foreseeable future, so he resigned. 97 Despite this
continuous pattern of discriminatory treatment, the court held that
the plaintiff had not been constructively discharged. 9 The court con-
cluded that while the denials of promotion had angered and frustrated
the plaintiff, and would have angered and frustrated any reasonable
person in his position, his working conditions were not rendered intol-
retirement with a reduced annuity of $15,000 per year. Id. The plaintiff chose retire-
ment. He felt that a demotion would be degrading and that, given the apparent pattern of
EEOC's discrimination against white males, there was no chance of being promoted to a
GS-15 managerial position. Id.
93. Jurgens, 903 F.2d at 388.
94. Id. at 392. The Court further reasoned that "without continuing harassment or
repeated discriminatory impediment to any advance, . . . dimmed future job prospects
based upon the employer's past discrimination in promotions are not alone enough to
support a finding of constructive discharge." Id. at 393. The court felt that the plaintiff's
expectation of future discrimination in promotion "assumes that a GS- 15 job would open,
that [he] would in fact be the most qualified candidate, and that EEOC would discrimi-
nate against him and select someone else. We agree that as a matter of law such a remote
possibility would not make a reasonable employee feel compelled to resign." Id. at 392-
93.
95. The classic example of a denial of promotion eliminating all avenues of advance-
ment is where the plaintiff is denied a promotion to partner in a law firm, Ezold v. Wolf,
Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp 303 (E.D. Pa. 1991), or in an accounting
firm, Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987). A similar example
occurs in corporations, where the employee is denied a major promotion into manage-
ment. See, e.g., Jolly v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. 1991) (three
denials of promotion into management); Halbrook v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 735 F.
Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denial of promotion to General Counsel in corporation's
legal department). This is commonly known as the "glass ceiling" or "employment ceil-
ing." Another example is where the employee is denied a promotion into a unique posi-
tion. See Nobler v. Beth Israel Medical Ctr., 715 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Director
of Radiation Therapy at major New York City medical center); EEOC v. Hay Assocs.,
545 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1982)(denial of promotion to senior associate consultant in
defendant's "Executive Financial Counseling Service").
96. 766 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. 1991).
97. Id. at 497.
98. Id. at 496-97.
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erable. 99 Hence his resignation was deemed to be voluntary, and he
was not entitled to postresignation relief.
As Jolly illustrates, because of the constructive discharge rule's fo-
cus on an employee's working conditions, strict application of the rule
in promotion cases is "almost illogical"" and essentially places the
employee in a no-win situation:
[N]o matter how severe an employer's discrimination is with re-
spect to the denial of promotion, an employee would be forced to
remain in the inferior employment position so long as the employer
does not permit the working conditions of the inferior employment
position to become intolerable. If the employee instead resigns the
inferior position, her entitlement to a remedy for the discrimina-
tory denial of the superior position would cease at the date of
resignation.'0 1
For example, in Jolly, although the plaintiff was denied three promo-
tions into management, the "working conditions" of his Senior Prod-
uct Specialist position remained tolerable. 102 Hence, Jolly was placed
into a Catch-22 position: if he remained, he would be locked in an
inferior position; if he resigned, he would risk becoming unemployed
and forfeiting a make-whole remedy. Obviously believing his career
to be at an end at NTI, he gambled on the latter choice, and lost.
Jolly is a prime example of the illogic of rigidly applying the construc-
tive discharge rule in denial of promotion cases.' 03
Application of the constructive discharge rule in promotion cases
can also frustrate Title VII's purposes, elimination of workplace dis-
crimination and compensation of the injured employee. First, since
employers are not liable for postresignation relief absent constructive
discharge, they have less incentive to eliminate discriminatory promo-
tion practices. Second, employers can engage in subtle discrimination
- giving inferior work assignments and denying promotions -
which, so long as working conditions are not intolerable, will not
99. Id. at 497.
100. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp. 303, 308 (E.D. Pa.
1991).
101. Id.
102. Jolly v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 480, 497 (E.D. Va. 1991).
103. The same type of no-win situation could also occur with other forms of employ-
ment discrimination, such as unlawful transfer or demotion. For instance, in Marley v.
United Parcel Service, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 119 (D.R.I. 1987), the plaintiff, a supervisor at a
UPS loading facility, was transferred to a less prestigious supervisor position. There were
several other aggravating factors that, together with the demotion, diminished her pro-
motion potential. Id. at 130-33. It can be readily seen that Ms. Marley's predicament
was identical to Mr. Jolly's. In Marley, however, the court held that the plaintiff had
been constructively discharged. Id. at 130.
9971992]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
make the employer liable past the date at which the employee re-
signs."°  Hence, the rule frustrates Title VII's make-whole purpose
since, absent a finding of constructive discharge, employees cannot
collect postresignation backpay or be reinstated to the position wrong-
fully denied. 05
To alleviate this potential unfairness and to better effectuate Title
VII's mandate, a few recent cases have taken novel approaches where
the plaintiff has resigned following a denial of promotion: (1) circum-
venting the constructive discharge rule completely; and (2) adhering
to the rule, but focusing on the employee's reasonable expectations of
promotion and advancement in addition to the employee's working
conditions. The next two sections analyze these approaches.
B. Ezold and Nobler: Circumventing the Constructive
Discharge Rule
Two recent failure to promote cases, Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr
and Soils-Cohen '0 and Nobler v. Beth Israel Medical Center,10 7 ac-
knowledge the harshness of applying the constructive discharge rule
in certain promotion cases and pose a solution to the problem. In the
usual case the court will only conduct one inquiry, i.e., whether the
employee was constructively discharged. If the employee was not
constructively discharged, then he or she is not entitled to post-
resignation relief at all. However, in Ezold and Nobler the court con-
ducted two inquiries. First, the court asked whether the employee was
constructively discharged. Second, if the employee was not construc-
tively discharged, the court further examined whether the employee's
resignation was reasonable under the circumstances. If the resigna-
tion was found to be reasonable, the court could award postresigna-
tion relief, even where no traditional constructive discharge took
place. l'
104. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 758 F. Supp 303, 312 (E.D. Pa.
1991).
105. See id. at 310; but see supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
106. The district court bifurcated the Ezold case at the request of the parties. The
November 1990 opinion addressed liability only, 751 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
[hereinafter Ezold I], and the March 1991 opinion addressed the appropriate relief, 758 F.
Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1991) [hereinafter Ezold Il]. A third opinion, issued in July 1991,
addressed the issues of backpay calculation, reinstatement of the plaintiff to partner, and
her mitigation of damages. No. 90-0002, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10270, 56 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 580 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 1991) [hereinafter Ezold III].
107. The Nobler case was also bifurcated. The 1988 opinion addressed liability, 702 F.
Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) [hereinafter Nobler 1], and the 1989 opinion addressed the
appropriate relief, 715 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) [hereinafter Nobler I1].
108. Both courts followed the minority rule explained in Part II.C, supra.
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1. Ezold v. Wolf, Block
In Ezold, a large law firm denied the plaintiff, a female associate, a
partnership position in the litigation department."°9 The firm offered
to make her a partner in the domestic relations department effective
one year later, but she declined that offer and resigned." 0 Judge
James M. Kelly of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that
Wolf, Block had unlawfully denied Ms. Ezold partnership status on
the basis of gender."' However, Judge Kelly also held that Wolf,
Block had not constructively discharged Ms. Ezold, since her working
conditions were not objectively intolerable.'1 2
Despite finding that no constructive discharge had occurred, Judge
Kelly, relying heavily" 3 on the Harrison v. Dole line of cases that
comprise the minority rule on postresignation relief," 4 held that the
constructive discharge rule would not bar postresignation relief." 5
First, Judge Kelly reasoned that Title VII's purposes" 6 would be un-
dermined if the constructive discharge rule was strictly applied in this
case."' 7 Second, he reasoned that the restriction on available relief
would discourage the plaintiff from mitigating damages by accepting a
109. Ezold 1, 751 F. Supp. at 1189.
110. Id. at 1189-90. The firm's offer of a domestic relations partnership effective in one
year was contingent on Ms. Ezold remaining at the firm as an associate for that year
without an annual salary increase typically granted to associates. Id. at 1190.
111. Id. at 1189. Several other male associates, who had lesser credentials than the
plaintiff, were admitted to the partnership. Id. at 1184-87.
112. Id. at 1192.
113. Ezold 11, 758 F. Supp. at 308-10 (citing Helbing v. Unclaimed Salvage and
Freight Co., Inc., 489 F. Supp. 956 (E.D. Pa. 1980), Wells v. North Carolina Bd. of
Alcoholic Control, 714 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1983), Richardson v. Restaurant Mktg. As-
socs., Inc., 527 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Cal. 1981), and Harrison v. Dole, 643 F. Supp. 794
(D.D.C. 1986)). For a discussion of these and other cases, see supra notes 74-81 and
accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
115. Ezold 11, 758 F. Supp. at 310. In the third opinion, issued on July 23, 1991, the
court held that Ms. Ezold had mitigated her damages by accepting a position as president
and chief counsel of BES Environmental Specialists, instead of remaining in her position
as a litigation associate. The court ordered the plaintiff reinstated as a partner in Wolf,
Block's litigation department, and awarded her $131,784 in postresignation backpay.
Ezold III, No. 90-0002, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10270, 56 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
580 (E.D. Pa. July 23, 1991).
Ezold is on appeal at the Third Circuit. In the event the Third Circuit reverses Judge
Kelly's award of postresignation relief, Ezold has filed a protective cross-appeal seeking
to reverse his finding that no constructive discharge occurred. The appeal relies on Hop-
kins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1987), which held that denial
of promotion to partnership at an accounting firm, coupled with the defendant's refusal
to renominate plaintiff as a partnership candidate, constituted constructive discharge.
Appellee-Cross-Appellant's Brief at 56-58, Ezold (Nos. 91-1741, 91-1780).
116. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
117. Ezold I1, 758 F. Supp. at 310.
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position at another law firm where she would be permitted to advance
without discrimination.' 8
In awarding Ms. Ezold postresignation relief despite holding that
she had not been constructively discharged, Judge Kelly effectively
circumvented the constructive discharge rule. His central premise
was that, where an employee resigns after having been denied the one
significant promotion available within the arena of his or her employ-
ment, "a more appropriate standard for determining the entitlement
to relief past the date of resignation is one of reasonableness."'"19 Ap-
plying this standard, Judge Kelly concluded that although Ms.
Ezold's "working conditions" were not so objectively intolerable as to
constitute constructive discharge, her "conduct in leaving the firm
was not unreasonable,"'2 ° since she had been denied "the one signifi-
cant promotion available to an attorney" who works for a law firm. 2'
Although the underlying premise of the constructive discharge rule
is that employees should attack discrimination while still employed,'22
Judge Kelly reasoned that applying this premise in promotion cases is
impractical. He stated that "the policy of encouraging solutions
within the context of the working relationship makes sense only when
a possible solution exists."' 23 Since the discrimination made it un-
likely that Ms. Ezold would ever become a litigation partner,124 a so-
lution "within the context of the working relationship" was
foreclosed. Therefore, Judge Kelly concluded, her resignation was
"not unreasonable"'' 25 and she was entitled to postresignation relief.
2. Nobler v. Beth Israel Medical Center
Two years prior to Ezold, the Southern District of New York
reached a similar result in Nobler v. Beth Israel Medical Center.26 In
Nobler, the defendant hospital denied the 53 year-old plaintiff a pro-
motion to the position of Director of Radiation Therapy, allegedly in
118. Id. (citing Harrison v. Dole, 643 F. Supp. 794, 796 (D.D.C. 1986)).
119. Ezold 11, 758 F. Supp. at 308 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 312 (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 310.
122. See Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980); supra
notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
123. Ezold 11, 758 F. Supp. at 311 (quoting Nobler v. Beth Israel Medical Ctr., 715 F.
Supp. 570, 572 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
124. Ezold 11, 758 F. Supp. at 311.
125. Id. at 312. The court based its conclusion in part on the following observation:
"When Wolf, Block unlawfully permitted gender to enter into its consideration of Ms.
Ezold for partner, she understandably came to the conclusion that her career at the Firm
would be limited to a much greater extent than she could reasonably accept." Id.
126. Nobler 11, 715 F. Supp. 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA). 27 Although there had been no constructive discharge, 28
the court held that postresignation relief might still be available if Mr.
Nobler could prove the underlying discrimination claim. 29
As in Ezold, the court reasoned that "the policy of encouraging
solutions within the context of the working relationship makes sense
only when a possible solution exists."'' 0 A "possible solution," such
as "promotion to an equivalent position,"' 3'a did not exist for Mr.
Nobler because the position of Director of Radiation Therapy was
unique. 32 As in Ezold, the court found that Mr. Nobler's decision to
resign was reasonable under the circumstances 33 and that therefore
he would be entitled to postresignation relief if he could prove the
underlying discrimination, even though he had not been construc-
tively discharged.'3 4
In both Ezold and Nobler, the discriminatory denial of promotion
locked the employee in a position for which he or she was overquali-
fied and in which there was little or no alternative avenue of advance-
ment. Working conditions were not rendered intolerable by the
failure to promote, and thus a traditional constructive discharge had
not occurred. Yet the harm to each employee was "irremediable."' 31 a
127. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1985). The standards governing damages in a case brought
under the ADEA are the same as those for a Title VII case. See, e.g., Pena v. Brattleboro
Retreat, 702 F.2d 322, 325 (2d Cir. 1983); Albano v. Schering-Plough Corp., 912 F.2d
384, 386 n.l (9th Cir. 1990).
128. Nobler I, 702 F. Supp. 1023, 1030 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)(noting that "Nobler's work
conditions had not yet changed in any respect," and that the hospital's President had
twice asked Nobler to stay). The court also cited Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d
1251, 1256 n.4 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986), and Irving v. Dubuque
Packing Co., 689 F.2d 170, 172 (10th Cir. 1982), both of which held that a discriminatory
denial of promotion, without more, does not constitute constructive discharge.
129. Nobler II, 715 F. Supp. at 572-73. The procedural disposition of this case is sig-
nificant to this holding. The court stated that "the remedy of backpay may be available
to Nobler if he is able to sustain his discrimination claim." Id. at 572 (emphasis added).
The holding was conditional, not because it was dictum, but rather because the court was
deciding the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the backpay issue. In effect,
the court was holding that the plaintiff's claim for backpay could go forward even though
there had been no constructive discharge. However, to be eligible for backpay, Nobler
would first have to prove the underlying discrimination.
130. Nobler II, 715 F. Supp. at 572.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 572-73 ("given the uniqueness of the position sought by Nobler, there was
no possible solution after Nobler was passed over").
134. Nobler 1I, 715 F. Supp. at 572. The court noted that this result "recognizes the
goal of making a victim of discrimination whole, without inhibiting the goal of encourag-
ing solutions to discrimination within the context of the employment relationship." Id. at
573.
135. Id. at 572.
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Therefore, both courts concluded that in denial of promotion cases, a
reasonableness test, rather than the constructive discharge rule, would
more effectively further the objectives of Title VII and would fulfill
the admonition in Albemarle to fashion the most complete relief possi-
ble.'36 In short, Ezold and Nobler challenge the general rule that, ab-
sent a finding of constructive discharge, an employee cannot obtain
postresignation relief. 137
C. Adhering to the Constructive Discharge Rule: The Denial of
Promotion as a "Career-Ending Action"
Whereas the Ezold and Nobler courts focused on the availability of
postresignation relief despite a finding of no constructive discharge,
the District of Columbia Circuit instead has attempted to conform the
constructive discharge rule to the promotion setting by analyzing
whether the denial of promotion itself amounted to a constructive dis-
charge. In Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse,3 ' the defendant accounting
firm denied the female plaintiff a promotion into the partnership. The
district court held that although the denial of promotion was discrim-
inatory, 139 it was not a constructive discharge, since the plaintiff had
not shown any history of discrimination, humiliation or other aggra-
vating factors that would have compelled her to resign."4
The D.C. Circuit, however, reversed and held that the denial of
partnership, coupled with the defendant's failure to renominate Ms.
Hopkins as a partnership candidate, constituted a constructive dis-
charge.141 Hence, postresignation relief would be available.'42 The
court emphasized that in assessing whether a constructive discharge
136. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
137. Ezold's and Nobler's challenge to the general constructive discharge rule is more
significant than the Harrison v. Dole line of cases that first crafted the minority rule. See
supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text. The latter cases did award postresignation
relief, but in most of them the constructive discharge rule was not even mentioned, so the
courts never made a decision one way or the other on the constructive discharge issue. In
Ezold and Nobler, however, the courts actually held that no constructive discharge had
occurred, yet they still held that the plaintiffs would be entitled to postresignation relief.
See supra notes 106-36 and accompanying text.
138. 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 490 U.S.
228 (1989), on remand, 737 F. Supp. 1202 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C. Cir.
1990).
139. Hopkins, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1121 (D.D.C. 1985).
140. Id. The court added: "Being denied partnership was undoubtedly a professional
disappointment and it may have been professionally advantageous for plaintiff to leave
the firm when it was unlikely she would not obtain her ultimate goal. Disappointments
do not constitute a constructive discharge, however." Id. (citing Bourque v. Powell Elec.
Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1980)).
141. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 472-73.
142. Id. at 473.
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has occurred, it need not focus solely on the employee's daily "work-
ing conditions." Instead, the court reasoned that "the intolerableness
of working conditions is very much a function of the reasonable ex-
pectations of the employee, including expectations of promotion or ad-
vancement."'143 Applying this "reasonable expectations" standard,
the court held that Price Waterhouse's decision to deny Ms. Hopkins
partnership status coupled with her department's failure to re-
nominate her, "would have been viewed by any reasonable senior
manager in her position as a career-ending action. Accordingly, it
amounted to a constructive discharge."14 In short, the denial of pro-
motion had itself created such an intolerable employment situation
that a constructive discharge had occurred.
Hopkins thus denotes a break from the established rule that a denial
of promotion does not constitute constructive discharge. 45 It stands
for the proposition that, where a denial of promotion amounts to "ca-
reer-ending" discrimination by the employer - as where the em-
ployee's reasonable expectations of future advancement have been
completely frustrated - then the employee has been constructively
discharged and is entitled to postresignation relief.
143. Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
144. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 473 (emphasis added). The court also noted that Ms. Hop-
kins " 'reasonably expected... opportunities for advancement' and that the employer's
actions 'essentially locked [her] into a position from which she could apparently obtain
no relief.'" Id. at 472 (quoting Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
Price Waterhouse appealed the case to the Supreme Court, but on other grounds. The
Supreme Court remanded the case so that appropriate relief could be awarded. 490 U.S.
228 (1989). On remand, the District Court held that Ms. Hopkins was entitled to post-
resignation backpay and reinstatement as a partner. 737 F. Supp. 1202, 1216 (D.D.C.
1990). The D.C. Circuit affirmed, reasoning that reinstatement would be "'the most
complete relief possible' and in fact the only possible relief that would restore Ann Hop-
kins to 'the situation [s]he would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed.'"
920 F.2d 967, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1990)(quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405, 419 (1975)) (emphasis and brackets in original).
145. See supra notes 82-99 and accompanying text. The Hopkins notion of "career-
ending" discrimination has been reiterated in subsequent cases, with varying results. See
Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 392-93 (5th Cir. 1990) (implying that career-ending
denial of promotion might create enough embarrassment and humiliation to result in
constructive discharge, though not in this case); Contardo v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, 753 F. Supp. 406, 411 (D. Mass. 1990) (applying Hopkins, court held that
denial of money-making opportunities to female stockbroker, while discriminatory, was
not career-ending); Halbrook v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 121, 127-28
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (absence of any further chance of advancement with defendant, coupled
with other aggravating factors, raised inference that plaintiff was constructively dis-
charged); Howard v. Daiichiya-Love's Bakery, 714 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (D. Haw. 1989)
(court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment on constructive discharge issue,
citing Hopkins' reasoning that working conditions are a function of reasonable expecta-
tions for promotion or advancement; plaintiff could present case to jury).
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D. Harmonizing Ezold and Hopkins
Both Ezold and Hopkins correctly acknowledge that it can be rea-
sonable for an employee to resign after a denial of a major promotion.
However, under similar circumstances, the courts took different ana-
lytical approaches to the constructive discharge inquiry. In Ezold,
Judge Kelly first found no constructive discharge but then conducted
a second inquiry that focused on the reasonableness of the plaintiff's
resignation. 46 In contrast, the Hopkins court used a "reasonable-
ness" test in the constructive discharge inquiry itself. 47 Under the
Hopkins reasonable expectations test, if the denial of promotion is ca-
reer-ending, then the employee has been constructively discharged
and can obtain postresignation relief.'4 s However, even though the
courts concluded differently on the constructive discharge issue, they
awarded similar relief using similar reasoning - whether, in light of
the employee's employment expectations, it was reasonable for her to
resign. 149
The combined rationale of Hopkins and Ezold, both of which fo-
cused on the reasonableness of the employee's resignation, will be ap-
plied in the next section, which advocates that a "reasonable
expectations" constructive discharge test should be applied in all de-
nial of promotion cases, including those that are not "career-ending."
IV. A Proposal for a More Reasonable Standard of Constructive
Discharge in Denial of Promotion Cases
Despite the decisions in Ezold and Nobler, a majority of courts still
hold that a finding of no constructive discharge bars postresignation
relief. 150 These majority courts implicitly reason that an award of
postresignation relief to an employee who was not constructively dis-
charged is inconsistent with the whole premise of constructive dis-
charge - that only when an employer's actions forced an involuntary
resignation would the employee be entitled to post-termination reme-
dies. Furthermore, despite the decision in Hopkins, most courts still
hold that a discriminatory denial of promotion, without more, does
not constitute a constructive discharge.' When applied in the pro-
146. See supra notes 109-25 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 138-45 and accompanying text.
148. Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 472-73.
149. Ezold 11, 758 F. Supp. at 310, 312 (plaintiff had been denied the one significant
promotion available to an attorney, and therefore it was "not unreasonable" for her to
resign); Hopkins, 825 F.2d at 472-73 (in light of plaintiff's "reasonable expectations" for
promotion, denial of partnership amounted to "career-ending action").
150. See supra notes 48-73 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 82-99 and accompanying text.
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motion setting, however, the constructive discharge rule often oper-
ates harshly, because it precludes make-whole relief to deserving
plaintiffs. ' For these reasons, this Note proposes that the con-
structive discharge rule be applied in the denial of promotion context
by using the Hopkins "reasonable expectations" test as part of the
aggravating factors analysis of the traditional constructive discharge
rule.
A. Reasonable Expectations of Promotion as a Potential
Aggravating Factor
The general constructive discharge rule states that the trier of fact
must find that "working conditions were so difficult or unpleasant
that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes would have felt com-
pelled to resign." '53 In order to find that working conditions were
"intolerable," most courts require the plaintiff to prove the presence
of "aggravating factors.' ' 5 4
As in the traditional analysis, the issue under a Hopkins approach
would be whether enough "aggravating factors" exist to make work-
ing conditions so intolerable as to amount to a constructive dis-
charge.' 5" Under this "reasonable expectations" analysis, however,
"intolerableness" would be a function not only of the employee's daily
working conditions but also of the employee's reasonable expectations
of career advancement. The more apparent it becomes that the em-
ployee's reasonable opportunities for promotion have been frustrated,
the more serious is the aggravating factor. The more serious the ag-
gravating factor, the closer the employee is to constructive dis-
charge.' 56 In those cases where the negation of the employee's
reasonable expectations of promotion rises to an extreme level, as in
the case of career-ending discrimination, then a "reasonable em-
ployee" would be compelled to resign and would be considered to
have been constructively discharged, even though no other aggravat-
ing factors were present. 57 However, in those cases where the denial
152. See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
153. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 65 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Alicea
Rosado v. Garcia Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 119 (1st Cir. 1977)).
154. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
156. It should be made clear that this would be an objective analysis. The court would
consider whether a reasonable employee in the position of the plaintiff would feel that the
plaintiff's reasonable prospects for promotion or advancement have been curtailed to an
intolerable degree.
157. See infra notes 173-86 and accompanying text. A Third Circuit case provides
additional support for Hopkins' emphasis on the employee's reasonable expectations of
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of promotion is less than career-ending, the plaintiff would have to
prove that there were aggravating factors accompanying the denial of
promotion that compelled his or her resignation.15
B. Policy Justifications for the Reasonable Expectations Analysis
The policies of Title VII and of the constructive discharge rule sup-
port the use of this reasonable expectations analysis in denial of pro-
motion cases. First, the reasonable expectations analysis more readily
furthers the statutory purposes of Title VII than does the traditional
constructive discharge rule. 59 It furthers the first objective of eradi-
cating workplace discrimination by deterring employers from unlaw-
fully denying promotions to deserving employees. Where the
employee's reasonable prospects for advancement were frustrated by
discrimination, the employee would not forfeit postresignation relief
by resigning. This added prospect of postresignation liability would
encourage employers to eliminate discriminatory promotion prac-
tices. 1  The analysis also furthers the second objective of making the
plaintiff whole, since he or she will receive compensation that would
have been due but for the unlawful failure to promote. Hence, the
analysis permits employees to avoid the no-win predicament of being
forced to choose between remaining in the inferior position, and
promotion. In Levendos v. Stern Entertainment, Inc., 860 F.2d 1227 (3d Cir. 1988), the
court, in denying the defendant employer's motion for summary judgment, stated:
[W]e cannot state as a broad proposition of law that a single non-trivial incident
of discrimination can never be egregious enough to compel a reasonable person
to resign. An employment discrimination plaintiff may simply face a more diffi-
cult burden of proof in establishing the employer's liability, when relying on a
single discriminatory incident as a basis for arguing the occurrence of construc-
tive discharge.
Id. at 1232. In the promotion context, where a "single non-trivial" denial of promotion
curtails or eliminates the employee's reasonable prospects for advancement, the employee
should be allowed to present his or her case to the trier of fact. See also Schafer v. Bd. of
Pub. Educ., 903 F.2d 243, 250 (3d Cir. 1990)(employees claiming constructive discharge
need not prove aggravating factors).
158. See infra notes 190-207 and accompanying text; e.g., Halbrook v. Reichhold
Chems., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 121, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (reasonable inference of construc-
tive discharge raised where female plaintiff was denied promotion to General Counsel;
several aggravating factors were present, including "change in responsibilities, reduction
in workload, humiliation and embarrassment, and the absence of any further chance of
advancement within Reichhold") (emphasis added).
159. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text (arguing that applying the con-
structive discharge rule in denial of promotion cases can frustrate the purposes of Title
VII).
160. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (reasoning that pre-
sumptive backpay liability creates an incentive for employers to "shun practices of dubi-
ous legality").
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forfeiting full compensation by resigning. 16'
Second, the reasonable expectations analysis furthers the underly-
ing purposes of the Glass Ceiling Act of 1991,162 which is intended to
focus greater attention on the elimination of "artificial barriers to the
advancement of women and minorities to management and decision-
making positions in business."' 6 a To this end, Congress established
the Glass Ceiling Commission to study and to recommend ways to:
eliminate artificial barriers to the advancement of women and minori-
ties; and, to increase opportunities and developmental experiences of
women and minorities to foster advancement to upper levels of busi-
ness.' By deterring employers' discriminatory promotion practices,
the reasonable expectations analysis would further the goal of remov-
ing barriers to the advancement of women and minorities in business.
Third, the analysis upholds the courts' command that employees
should not quit at the first sign of discrimination, but rather should,
wherever possible, attack discrimination from within the existing em-
ployment relationship. 65 This policy has a very important caveat:
where it is not "possible" for the employee to attack the discrimina-
tion while still employed - as is the case with a "career-ending" de-
nial of promotion - the employer should be deemed to have
compelled the employee to quit. As illustrated below,' 66 employees
denied promotions that are less than "career ending" might still be
required to fight the discrimination while employed.
Fourth, the reasonable expectations analysis is a sounder approach
than that of Ezold. In circumventing the constructive discharge rule,
the Ezold line of cases correctly acknowledged the unfairness that
often results in applying the rule rigidly in every case. They held that
the relevant inquiry is mitigation of damages, reasoning that if the
employee can prove he or she attempted to mitigate damages after
resigning, the employee would be entitled to postresignation relief
even where there was no finding of constructive discharge.' 67
However, the Ezold approach is fundamentally inconsistent. When
a court finds a "constructive" discharge, it is holding implicitly that
161. See supra notes 100-103 and accompanying text.
162. Pub. L. No. 102-166, Title II, 105 Stat. 1081 (1991). This Act is part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, supra note 3.
163. Id. § 202(a)(5)(A).
164. Id. § 203(a).
165. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 66 (5th Cir. 1980) (emphasis
added).
166. See infra notes 187-207 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 77-81, 113-18 and accompanying text.
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the employee was unlawfully dismissed, in effect, fired. 168 Hence an
award of wrongful termination (postresignation) remedies is justified.
But when a court finds that the employee was not constructively dis-
charged, it is holding that the employee resigned voluntarily. An
award of wrongful termination remedies is not justified where the em-
ployee resigned voluntarily, because the employee has not been
wrongfully terminated. In short, to hold that an employee, who re-
signed voluntarily, is nonetheless entitled to damages for wrongful dis-
charge, is inconsistent. 169
Furthermore, if the sole issue was mitigation of damages, arguably
every employee who was denied any promotion - no matter how
minor - would be entitled to postresignation relief, subject only to
the employee's duty to mitigate. Again, this undermines the policy
that employees should attack discrimination within the employment
relationship, since employees would be permitted to "quit at the first
sign of discrimination"1 70 (the denial of promotion) and to receive
postresignation relief nonetheless.
The better approach is to view the employer's negation of the em-
ployee's reasonable expectations of promotion as a potential aggravat-
ing factor, so that, like Hopkins, employees such as Ezold and Nobler
would be considered to have been constructively discharged and
would be properly entitled to postresignation remedies. However,
employees denied minor promotions would still be required to attack
the discrimination while employed, and would not be entitled to post-
resignation relief if they resigned.' 71
168. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
169. See Derr v. Gulf Oil Co., 796 F.2d 340, 343 (10th Cir. 1986) ("The trial court's
findings that Ms. Derr was not constructively discharged and that she acted reasonably in
resigning are inconsistent when viewed in light of the proper test for determining when an
employee is constructively discharged").
To the extent Judge Kelly was constrained by stare decisis in being compelled to find
that Ms. Ezold had not been constructively discharged, the author does support his effort
to utilize his equitable discretion in fashioning make-whole relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g) (giving district court equitable discretion to fashion Title VII remedies). Hopefully,
if the Hopkins approach advocated in this Note is applied in the future, there will be no
need to circumvent the constructive discharge rule. Rather, plaintiffs such as Ezold
would be found to have been constructively discharged, thus properly entitling them to
postresignation relief.
170. Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 802 F.2d 1131, 1134 (9th Cir. 1986).
171. See infra notes 187-207 and accompanying text. There is an additional justifica-
tion for the reasonable expectations analysis. The analysis recognizes that the traditional
constructive discharge rule, used initially to protect union employees in National Labor
Relations Board cases, is not completely compatible with employment discrimination liti-
gation. In NLRB cases, the constructive discharge rule was created specifically to pre-
vent employers from inflicting harsh working conditions upon their employees in order to
force those employees to quit. See Crystal Princeton Refining Co., 222 N.L.R.B. 1068
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C. Applying the Reasonable Expectations Analysis
The reasonable expectations analysis might be applied in three dis-
tinct factual situations: (1) the "career-ending" denial of promotion,
where an employment ceiling has been neared or reached; (2) the sin-
gle denial of promotion with no employment ceiling; and (3) a denial
of promotion joined with other claims of discrimination or with ag-
gravating factors. The following three sections apply the analysis in
each of the three factual situations.17 2
1. Career-ending Denial of Promotion
Under the Hopkins analysis, where the employee's "reasonable ex-
pectations" of promotion or advancement have been frustrated to an
intolerable degree by the employer's discriminatory actions, then this
denial would be an aggravating factor that, together with the denial of
promotion, would amount to a constructive discharge. 73 This type of
"career-ending" discrimination can occur with a single denial of pro-
motion that eliminates virtually all potential for advancement. 1 4
(1976); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 461 F.2d 490, 494 (4th Cir. 1972). Hence the rule
focused on the daily working conditions of the blue collar union employee.
Subsequently, courts borrowed the constructive discharge rule without fully adapting it
to the realities of employment discrimination law under Title VII. In the white collar
context especially, "working conditions," such as hours, safety, and relations with super-
visors, are not the sole focus. Rather, the focus is on employment opportunities, such as
the hire, promotion and transfer of employees, and other career-related issues. See Ezold
11, 758 F. Supp. at 313. In Title VII cases, employment opportunities - such as oppor-
tunities for promotion and advancement - can become quite intolerable even though
everyday working conditions remain bearable. The traditional constructive discharge
rule, with its focus on daily working conditions, is not fully equipped to remedy this
situation. However, the reasonable expectations analysis, with its added focus on oppor-
tunities for career advancement, would make the constructive discharge analysis more
more relevant to Title VII litigation.
172. It should be made clear that this Note is not simply advocating that the Hopkins
reasonable expectations test be applied only where the plaintiff has suffered "career-end-
ing" discrimination, as was the case in Hopkins itself. Rather, the Note goes one step
further in advocating that the reasonable expectations test be used in all cases where the
plaintiff alleges a denial of promotion. See infra notes 173-207 and accompanying text.
173. The negation of an employee's reasonable expectations of promotion or advance-
ment could be considered "intolerable," where, for example, a reasonable employee in the
position of the plaintiff felt that he or she had no reasonable prospect of obtaining compa-
rable alternative employment with the defendant employer. Cf. Whittlesey v. Union Car-
bide Corp., 742 F.2d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1984) (listing three prerequisites for award of front
pay in lieu of reinstatement, one of which is, "where the factfinder can reasonably predict
that the plaintiff has no reasonable prospect of obtaining comparable alternative
employment").
174. See, e.g., Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(denial of
promotion.into partnership); Ezold II, 758 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Pa. 1991)(same); Nobler I,
702 F. Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)(denial of promotion to Director of Radiation Ther-
apy, a unique position).
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This was the case with Nancy Ezold and Ann Hopkins, both of whom
were denied a promotion into a partnership, and with Myron Nobler,
who was denied a promotion into a unique position. Under the rea-
sonable expectations analysis, these three employees would be found
to have been constructively discharged, since their reasonable expec-
tations for advancement were frustrated completely. 175
Career-ending discrimination might also occur with multiple deni-
als of promotion, as was the case in Jolly v. Northern Telecom, Inc. 176
Edward Jolly, an African-American, was hired as a Product Specialist
for Northern Telecom, Inc. (NTI), a communications company, in
May 1985.177 He was promoted to Senior Product Specialist in July
1986178 and resigned in July 1988.79 Throughout his tenure at NTI,
Jolly attempted to obtain promotions into management, but was
rebuffed three times.'80 After the third denial of promotion, the Mar-
keting Manager for the Eastern Region insinuated to Jolly that Jolly's
management opportunities at NTI were a virtual nullity. 81
The district court held that the third denial of promotion was un-
lawful and in violation of Title VII. Claims for the other two denials
of promotion were time-barred.'82 However, the court held that NTI
175. Under the reasonable expectations analysis advocated in this Note, a "career-end-
ing" denial of promotion might also encompass a university's denial of tenure or full
professorship to a college professor. See Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891 F.2d
337, 359-61 (1st Cir. 1989)(affirming that retroactive tenure is an appropriate Title VII
remedy); Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 737 F. Supp. 1393 (D.N.J. 1990), aff'd in rele-
vant part, 941 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1991)(retroactive promotion to full professorship is an
appropriate Title VII remedy); Jew v. Univ. of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 946, 960-63 (S.D. Iowa
1990)(same).
In these three cases, the plaintiff had not resigned after the denial of promotion, so
constructive discharge was not at issue. However, if the plaintiff had resigned, the Hop-
kins analysis might dictate that a constructive discharge had occurred, since a denial of
tenure or full professorship would seem to be "career-ending."
176. 766 F. Supp. 480 (E.D. Va. 1991).
177. Id. at 482.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 487.
180. In his first bid, Jolly was passed over for a promotion to Technical Marketing
Manager for the Eastern Region, and the position was given to a less-qualified white
male. Jolly, 766 F. Supp. at 484. In his second bid, Jolly was passed over for promotion
to Marketing Manager for a product called "Meridian Digital Centrex," which NTI sold
to business customers. The position was given to a white male who had no substantive
product knowledge. Id. at 485. In his third bid, Jolly was denied a promotion to Re-
gional Support Manager, and the position was given to a white male who had much less
experience and education than Jolly. Id. at 486-88.
181. Id. at 487, 497.
182. Id. at 493-96. In a prior opinion, this court held that the first two instances of
failure to promote were time barred. Nonetheless, in the present case, the court ruled
that prior discriminatory acts that were not made the basis for a timely charge could
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had not constructively discharged Jolly. 8 3 A court applying the rea-
sonable expectations analysis most likely would find that a construc-
tive discharge had occurred. The three discriminatory denials of
promotion into management, viewed cumulatively as career-ending
action, would constitute an employment ceiling and therefore an in-
tolerable aggravating factor.' 8 4 Hence Jolly's resignation would be
deemed reasonable under the circumstances, and the court would find
a constructive discharge, entitling Jolly to postresignation relief.'
8 5
The reasonable expectations analysis is therefore most beneficial
where the denial of promotion effectively ends the employee's career
constitute relevant background evidence in a proceeding brought to redress subsequent
injury. Jolly, 766 F. Supp. at 493.
183. Id. at 496-97. The district court, sitting in the Fourth Circuit, applied the "em-
ployer intent" version of the constructive discharge rule, which only two Circuits follow.
See Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Bunny
Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1256 (8th Cir. 1981). The employer intent test requires the
employee to prove that working conditions were objectively intolerable, and that the in-
tolerable working conditions were imposed with the specific intent of forcing the em-
ployee to resign. See supra note 50. The court found that NTI had not intended to force
Jolly to quit and therefore had not constructively discharged him. Jolly, 766 F. Supp. at
496-97.
However, even if the court had applied the reasonable employee test, see supra notes
48-65 and accompanying text, it would not have found constructive discharge, since it did
not believe that Jolly's working conditions had been made objectively intolerable. Jolly,
766 F. Supp. at 497 ("It cannot be said, however, that [the three denials of promotion]
rendered working conditions objectively intolerable, even though Jolly himself may have
found that he could no longer stand it").
184. Incredibly, even though the court noted that he had run into an employment
ceiling ("it is clear that he had reached his zenith at NTI as a senior product specialist
and could not hope to achieve anything more," Jolly, 766 F. Supp. at 496), it held that he
had not been constructively discharged. Id. at 496-97.
Jolly represents the classic case of a court refusing to take into account the complete
frustration of an employee's reasonable expectations of advancement as representing an
intolerable working condition:
It is true that [Jolly] was thrice passed over for promotional opportunities that
he should have received, and it is also true that [the Marketing Manager]
dropped him an unmistakable hint that he would not be promoted to NTI man-
agement in the foreseeable future. The sum total of these events undoubtedly
increased Jolly's anger and frustration. Indeed, they would have angered and
frustrated any reasonable person in Jolly's position. It cannot be said, however,
that they rendered working conditions objectively intolerable, even though Jolly
himself may have found that he could no longer stand it.
Id. at 497. Under the reasonable expectations analysis advocated in this Note, three dis-
criminatory denials of promotion into management would be considered "career-ending
action" and therefore constructive discharge. See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d
458, 472-73 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
185. See also Cowan v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 703 F. Supp. 177 (D. Conn.
1987), aff'd, 852 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1988)(four denials of promotion from insurance agent
to sales manager over five year period could be considered career-ending action under
analysis advocated in this Note, though court held that there was no constructive
discharge).
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with the employer. Because their opportunities for advancement have
been eliminated entirely or diminished to an intolerable degree, em-
ployees like Ezold, Nobler, Hopkins, and Jolly should be deemed to
have been constructively discharged. 8 6 In short, the reasonable ex-
pectations approach would alleviate the unfairness of denying pos-
tresignation relief to employees who have run into an employment
ceiling and have subsequently resigned.
2. Single Denial of Promotion With No Employment Ceiling
Where an employee has been unlawfully denied a single promotion
but where no employment ceiling precludes the possibility of further
advancement, and no other aggravating factors are present, no con-
structive discharge would be found."8 7 Under the reasonable expecta-
tions analysis, the employee still has the duty, as he or she does under
the traditional constructive discharge rule, to combat the discrimina-
tion while remaining employed. Hence, the reasonable expectations
approach would not open the floodgates to postresignation relief in
every denial of promotion case. Rather, it would only impose post-
resignation liability where the opportunities for advancement are
completely frustrated, 88 or where a denial of promotion is combined
with other forms of discrimination or aggravating factors.8 9 In short,
the reasonable expectations analysis strikes a balance between the un-
fairness to employees of denying postresignation relief in every pro-
motion case and the unfairness to employers in awarding
postresignation relief in every promotion case.
3. Denial of Promotion Joined With Other Claims of
Discrimination or Aggravating Factors
A third situation would arise where the denial of promotion is less
186. Other fact situations might approach "career-ending action." See, e.g., Thomas v.
Cooper Industries, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 655 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (denial of promotion to Em-
ployee Relations Manager, head of defendant's personnel department); EEOC v. Hay
Associates, 545 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (denial of promotion to senior associate
consultant in defendant's "Executive Financial Counselling Service," a unique position
within company); Halbrook v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 121, 128 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denial of promotion from Assisant General Counsel to General Counsel
in corporation). Denial of tenure or full professorship to a college professor would also
seem to be "career-ending." See supra note 175.
187. See, e.g., Jurgens v. EEOC, 903 F.2d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 1990) (renewed advance-
ment in the EEOC not necessarily unexpected, after discriminatory denial of promotion
and lawful demotion due to reorganization). For an extended discussion of Jurgens, see
supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 173-86 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 190-207 and accompanying text.
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than career-ending, but where there also exists other discrimination
and/or aggravating factors. This section illustrates the reasonable ex-
pectations analysis, operating as a functional test,"9 in two broad
situations. 91
First, if the employee's opportunities for advancement have been
curtailed to a high degree 92 - though not so intolerable to be consid-
ered career-ending - this would be factored into the reasonable ex-
pectations analysis as a serious aggravating factor. With a relatively
serious "reasonable expectations of promotion" aggravating factor,
the quantity and quality of other aggravating factors would not have
to be great to find constructive discharge. Hence, the presence of
other aggravating factors would tip the scale toward a finding of con-
structive discharge. The lack of any additional forms of discrimina-
tion or aggravating factors, however, would preclude a finding of
constructive discharge, since the denial of promotion was not career-
ending.
For example, in Halbrook v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.,193 the
plaintiff Rebecca Halbrook was Assistant General Counsel for Reich-
hold Chemicals from 1982 to 1987. In 1983 Reichhold hired Charles
Lorelli, who also became Assistant General Counsel in 1986. In Sep-
tember 1987, Lorelli was promoted to General Counsel, so in Novem-
ber 1987 plaintiff resigned. Plaintiff alleged that she had been
unlawfully denied a promotion to General Counsel and constructively
190. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
191. Obviously, it is impossible to illustrate every potential application of this func-
tional analysis. Hence, this Note will only discuss two broad situations that can be easily
applied in other cases.
192. A "high degree" might be where, although the plaintiff has other avenues of ad-
vancement with the employer, he or she would be required to relocate in order to obtain a
promotion. Cf Churchill v. International Business Machines, Inc., 759 F. Supp. 1089,
1106 (D.N.J. 1991) (implying that offering employee positions at other company loca-
tions, though not such an intolerable condition as to amount to constructive discharge, is
a significant burden); Cherchi v. Mobil Oil Corp., 693 F. Supp. 156, 163 (D.N.J. 1988),
aff'd, 865 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1988)(same).
Another example is where an employee rises to a certain level in a particular depart-
ment and then is denied a promotion to the head of that department. See, e.g., Halbrook
v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (denial of promotion to
General Counsel, head of defendant corporation's legal department); Thomas v. Cooper
Industries, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 655 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (denial of promotion within the Per-
sonnel Department from acting Employee Relations Manager to permanent Employee
Relations Manager). In such a case, the employee would appear to have little opportu-
nity for advancement in that particular department. Hence obtaining a promotion would
require either (i) a lateral transfer into the same department at another company location,
or (ii) a transfer into a different department at the same company location. Obviously, in
both instances, the employer's discrimination has placed a "high degree" of burden upon
the employee, though perhaps not high enough to amount to a career-ending action.
193. 735 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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discharged. '94
In support of her constructive discharge claim, Halbrook alleged
that her working conditions were intolerable after Lorelli's promo-
tion. First, she asserted that she had little to do and was stripped of
concrete responsibilities; second, she asserted that she was humiliated
on a day-to-day basis by having to work with the very supervisors
who had discriminatorily denied her promotion; finally, she claimed
that she had no opportunity for further promotion at Reichhold.' 95
The defendant moved for summary judgment, but the court, apply-
ing a test similar to that proposed in this Note, denied the motion.
The court cited Hopkins for the proposition that "dashing reasonable
expectations of career advancement may create intolerable working
conditions that rise to the level of constructive discharge."' 96 Apply-
ing this standard, the court stated "that a reasonable person in Hal-
brook's position after Lorelli's promotion might have concluded that
she effectively had no more chances for advancement within Reich-
hold."' 97 At the very least, there was a question of fact on this
issue.198
However, plaintiff's lack of promotional opportunities was not the
sole basis of the court's decision; rather, the court considered the alle-
gations "as a whole."' 99 The court held that the "combination of fac-
tors" - change in responsibilities, humiliation and embarrassment,
and the absence of any further chance of advancement - raised a
reasonable inference that Halbrook had been constructively dis-
charged.2" Because the court considered the plaintiff's reasonable
expectations of promotion - in conjunction with other aggravating
factors - Halbrook represents an excellent application of the func-
tional test proposed in this Note.2"'
A second fact pattern would arise where the employee's opportuni-
ties for advancement have been only minimally affected, as where
194. Id. at 122-23.
195. Id. at 126.
196. Id. at 127 (citing Hopkins, 825 F.2d at [472-73]).
197. Halbrook, 735 F. Supp. at 128 n.7.
198. Id. at 128.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. There are other examples of this first fact pattern. See, e.g., Howard v. Daiichiya-
Love's Bakery, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (D. Haw. 1989) (citing Hopkins, 825 F.2d at
472); Marley v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 119 (D.R.I. 1987); Thomas v.
Cooper Industries, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 655 (W.D.N.C. 1986); EEOC v. Hay Assocs., 545
F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
In Thomas, Rebecca Thomas, the acting Employee Relations Manager in defendant
Cooper Industries' Personnel Department, was unlawfully denied a promotion to perma-
nent Employee Relations Manager in favor of a less-qualified male. Thomas, 627 F.
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comparable alternative positions exist with the employer. This mini-
mal curtailment of promotion opportunities would be considered only
a slight aggravating factor, and if no or only a small quantity or qual-
ity of other aggravating factors were present, there would be no con-
structive discharge.2 °2
However, the existence of other aggravating factors of a serious
quality or quantity, combined with the slight curtailment of promo-
tion opportunities, would push.the equation toward a constructive
discharge. For example, in EEOC v. Miller Brewing Company,2 "3 Les-
ter Binns was hired in November 1975 as a First Line Supervisor in
the Packaging Department of the Miller Brewery in Milwaukee, Wis-
consin. 2" Binns resigned in May 1979 and sued for discriminatory
denial of promotion to "Group Supervisor," and for constructive dis-
charge.20 5 In support of his constructive discharge claim, Binns al-
Supp. at 662. Thomas resigned and sued for Cooper's failure to promote and for con-
structive discharge. Id.
Had the failure to promote Thomas to Employee Relations Manager been the only
violation of Title VII, there is little doubt that the court would not have found a construc-
tive discharge under the traditional rule, since courts generally hold that a denial of pro-
motion does not amount to constructive discharge. However, under the reasonable
expectations analysis, the result might be different. Ms. Thomas' reasonable prospects for
advancement with Cooper have been curtailed to a fairly high degree, since she has been
denied a promotion into the head of her department. See supra note 192. Because this is a
serious aggravating factor, the quantity and quality of other aggravating factors present
need not be great for her to prove constructive discharge. In fact, an argument could be
made under the reasonable expectations test that she was constructively discharged, since
Employee Relations Manager, the head of the Personnel Department, is a "unique" posi-
tion. See Nobler II, 715 F. Supp. at 572 (denial of promotion to Director of Radiation
Therapy).
In Hay, the female plaintiff was an employee in Hay's "Executive Financial Counsel-
ling Service" (EFCS), a unit of Hay that furnished personal financial services to the exec-
utives of Hay's corporate clients. Hay, 545 F. Supp at 1068. She proved that Hay had
unlawfully delayed her promotion to associate consultant during 1975-76, and then un-
lawfully denied her a promotion to senior associate consultant in February 1977. Id. at
1082. She also proved a violation of the Equal Pay Act. Id. at 1083-84.
Under the functional analysis, it is probable that the plaintiff's prospects for advance-
ment with Hay were curtailed to a high degree, since the desired position was relatively
unique. See id. at 1068 (stating that the EFCS was "an insular unit within Hay and not
directly related to Hay's principal business activities"). Since this is a serious aggravating
factor, the quantity and quality of other aggravating factors would not have to be great to
find constructive discharge. The argument could also be made here that the denial of
promotion itself was career-ending and therefore a constructive discharge, see supra notes
173-86 and accompanying text, since the position was unique.
202. Such a case would be one of a "single denial of promotion with no employment
ceiling," as described in Part IV.C.2.
203. 650 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. Wis. 1986).
204. Id. at 740.
205. Id.
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leged several aggravating factors.2 °6
In applying the functional analysis to Binns' case, the court would
first determine to what degree his opportunities for advancement had
been frustrated. Since there were "approximately hundreds of open-
ings" with Miller,20 7 Binns' prospects for advancement with Miller
were viable. Since his opportunities for advancement were curtailed
to a low degree, this would be a slight aggravating factor. Therefore,
the only way the court could find a constructive discharge is if the
quality and quantity of the other aggravating factors were of a serious
magnitude.
In sum, the reasonable expectations analysis would not only allevi-
ate the remedial injustice that occurs with a career-ending denial of
promotion. It could also be used as a potential aggravating factor,
within the traditional constructive discharge analysis, in cases where
there are multiple discrimination claims and/or aggravating factors.
V. Conclusion
Application of the traditional constructive discharge rule can lead
to unfair results in denial of promotion cases brought under Title VII.
The rule focuses on whether an employee's working conditions have
risen to an intolerable level as a result of discrimination and whether
those conditions compelled the employee to resign. But the employee
whose working conditions remain tolerable - but whose reasonable
expectations for advancement have been thwarted as a result of the
unlawful failure to promote - is left without a make-whole remedy if
he or she resigns. This employee, deserving of promotion, is placed in
a no-win situation: to remain is to be locked in an inferior employ-
ment position; to resign is to risk unemployment and to be denied a
postresignation remedy. Recent cases have begun to recognize that
where opportunities for promotion and advancement have been frus-
trated to an intolerable degree, the constructive discharge rule should
not preclude postresignation relief. The employment ceiling has cre-
ated such an intolerable employment situation that the employee's
resignation from the inferior position should be deemed reasonable.
The reasonable expectations analysis draws on this reasoning and
applies it in the constructive discharge/aggravating factors inquiry of
every promotion case. The analysis adapts the constructive discharge
rule to the promotion context, since an employee's "working condi-
tions" would include his or her reasonable expectations of promotion.
206. Id. at 741-43.
207. Id. at 741.
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The analysis alleviates the injustice of denying a postresignation rem-
edy to an employee who has been the victim of a career-ending denial
of promotion. Where the denial of promotion is less than career-end-
ing, the analysis serves as a barometer of the seriousness of aggravat-
ing factors.
The reasonable expectations analysis advances the statutory pur-
poses of Title VII more readily than does the traditional constructive
discharge rule, since it deters unlawful promotion practices and pro-
vides make-whole relief to deserving plaintiffs. At the same time, it
furthers the constructive discharge policy that employees should not
quit at the first sign of discrimination, by requiring employees denied
less-than-career-ending promotions to combat discrimination while
remaining employed. Moreover, by deterring discriminatory promo-
tion practices, the analysis advances the Congressional policy of
breaking down the artificial barriers to the advancement of women
and minorities in business. Furthermore, since the analysis is a com-
ponent of the established constructive discharge rule, courts will
avoid the inconsistency of circumventing the rule in order to fashion a
postresignation remedy. Finally, because the analysis focuses on the
employee's reasonable expectations for career advancement - rather
than solely on the employee's daily working conditions - it makes
the constructive discharge rule more compatible with the underlying
principles of employment discrimination law.
Richard M. DeAgazio
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